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ARTICLES
BROKERS AND ADVISERS -WHAT'S

IN A NAME?

BarbaraBlack*

INTRODUCTION

More Americans than ever are currently investing in the securities
markets and assuming greater responsibility for their financial future.
This is particularly apparent with respect to the increasing number of
workers who must invest for their own retirement and cannot count on
pensions from their employers or the adequacy of social security
payments. Yet, unfortunately, many investors lack sufficient knowledge
about investment decisions' and find it difficult to obtain objective and
reliable investment advice. Although they can find many professionals
eager to sell them investment products, they frequently discover after
time that those professionals are not willing to give them ongoing advice
about how to manage their investments as market conditions and the
investors' needs change. Compounding the problem, investors are
confused about the roles and responsibilities of the various financial
services professionals who are competing for their investment dollars.
Unfortunately, two recent developments only serve to intensify
investors' confusion.
First, major brokerage firms are aggressively marketing brokerage
accounts that charge the customer a fee based on the value of the assets
in his account in lieu of the traditional transaction-based fee structure.
In recent years, substantial amounts of customers' assets have moved
. Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B.A., Barnard College;
J.D.,
Columbia Law School. Jill I. Gross and James J. Fishman provided valuable comments
on this article.
1. According to the NASD, 97% of investors realize that they need to be better
informed about investing. Press Release, NASD, NASD Announces $10-Million
Education Fund (Dec. 2, 2003), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/
idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_002816.
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into these fee-based accounts or fee-based programs.
In an era of
competition from discount brokerage firms and diminished profits from
commissions, fee-based accounts benefit brokerage firms by providing
them with a steady, predictable revenue stream.3 Firms assert that the
shift away from commission income also promotes the customers' best
interests by divorcing investment advice from a sales transaction
because "in many cases the best advice [a registered representative] can
give is to 'do nothing."' 4 Accordingly, fee-based accounts better align
the customers' and the brokers' interests, because brokers are not
financially motivated to give advice to generate a sales commission.'
Second, prime time television advertising extolling the services of

brokerage firms has become part of American culture.
of the 1990s, advertisements from discount brokerage
the airwaves and encouraged investors to believe
accumulate fabulous wealth through online trading

In the euphoria
firms dominated
that they could
and their own

investment acumen.6 With the bursting of the stock market bubble, the

sales pitch has changed. Advertising now heavily promotes the image of
the broker as a trusted family adviser, with both the financial expertise
and the concern to attend to the long-term financial well-being of the

customer and his or her family.7

The Securities and Exchange

2. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quotes an industry source
which estimates that assets in fee-based accounts grew by 60.9 percent in 2003-2004.
See Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act
Release No. 51,523, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424 at
20,431 (Apr. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Final Rule Release].
3. Final Rule Release, supra note 2, at 20,431.

4.

SEC,

REPORT OF

THE COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES,

[1995

Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,614, at 86,508-09 (Apr. 10, 1995)
[hereinafter Tully Report].
5. Final Rule Release, supra note 2, at 20,425 n. 12.
6. Advertising by the discount brokerage firm, E*Trade, best exemplifies this
trend. In one advertisement that was frequently aired at the time, a "regular-guy" auto
mechanic bought his own country with his investment proceeds; in another, an
unattractive woman in a luxurious home summons a younger man to massage her
bunions.
7. Morgan Stanley has run a series of advertisements that promote this image,
showing the broker at the hospital when his customer's baby is born, at soccer games
cheering for his customer's child, giving the toast at the wedding of his customer's
daughter, and relaxing at the beach with his customers while telling the wife that he
thinks she can buy the summer house she's always wanted. Other brokerage firms run
similar advertisements.
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Commission (SEC) recognized the dangers of this kind of advertising
almost fifty years ago, noting that it "may create an atmosphere of trust
and confidence, encouraging full reliance on broker-dealers and their
registered representatives as professional advisers in situations where
such reliance is not merited, and obscuring the merchandising aspects of
the retail securities business."'
Until 1999, it was clear, under the SEC's prevailing interpretation
of the Investment Advisers Act (IAA), 9 that the marketing of fee-based
accounts subjected broker-dealers to regulation under the IAA. A
broker-dealer is excluded from the IAA's definition of "investment
adviser" only if both (1) his performance of advisory services is "solely
incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer" and (2) he
receives "no special compensation" for his services.'0 A broker did not
receive "special compensation" if he was compensated for his services
through payment of a commission or other transaction-related fee. If,
however, the broker received a fee irrespective of activity in the account,
then he was receiving a fee for investment advice, or "special
compensation."" At that time the SEC believed that dual registration
was "not overly burdensome"' 2 and that the additional protections
available to investors under the IAA made it worth the cost. 3
In 1999, however, when major brokerage firms began to offer feebased accounts, the SEC proposed a rule to prevent broker-dealers from
being regulated as investment advisers solely because of what it
described as a "re-pricing" of their services.' 4 The SEC also granted
informal approval to the marketing of fee-based accounts pending
adoption of a final rule. Finally, on April 12, 2005, after a controversial
and prolonged rule-making process, 5 the SEC gave its formal approval
8. SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 8895, pt. 1, at 248 (1963) [hereinafter SEC Special Study].
9. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1)(C) (2001).
10. Id.
11.
Final Extension of Temporary Exemption from the Investment Advisers Act for
Certain Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 14,714, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 626, 1978 WL 196894, at *1 (Apr. 27, 1978).
12. Id.at *2.
13. Id.
14. Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act
Release No. 42,099, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1845, 70 SEC Docket 2486
(Nov. 4, 1999).
15. For a brief summary of the rule's history, see Final Rule Release, supra note 2,
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to the marketing of fee-based accounts with its adoption of Rule
202(a)( 1)-I (the "Rule") by eliminating "no special compensation" as a
requirement for exclusion from the statutory definition.' 6 The Rule
excludes broker-dealers that offer fee-based accounts from the definition
of "investment adviser," so long as any investment advice given is
"solely incidental to the brokerage services" provided to the fee-based
accounts and certain disclosure requirements are met.17
While approving the marketing of these fee-based accounts that
emphasized investment advice, the SEC acknowledged a further blurring
of the distinction between full-service broker-dealers and investment
advisers, 8 and the attendant investor confusion. It was also aware of
abuses by brokerage firms in marketing fee-based accounts. 9 SEC
Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman recognized that "investor confusion
about the obligations their financial service provider owes to them" was
widespread.20 Furthermore, both Commissioner Glassman and SEC
Chair William H. Donaldson questioned what impact brokerage firms'
advertising should have on broker-dealer regulation.2 ' In short, the
debate over the appropriate regulation of broker-dealers that increasingly
promote their advisory services to attract customers is far from over.
In this article, I first set forth a description of the three principal
types of financial services professionals that provide advice to customers
- broker-dealers, investment advisers and financial planners - and

at 20,425-27. During the lengthy comment period, the SEC received over 2,000
comment letters on either the rule as originally proposed in November 1999 or the rule
as reproposed in January 2005. Broker-dealers generally expressed strong support for
the proposal; many investment advisers, particularly financial planners, and investor
advocates vigorously opposed it.
16.
SEC Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(1 1)-I (2005).

17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. § 275.202(a)(1 1)-l(a)(1)(i).
See Final Rule Release, supra note 2, at 20,434.
See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
Cynthia A. Glassman, SEC Commissioner, Remarks Before the Open Meeting

Regarding the IA/BD Rule (Apr. 6, 2005), http://www.sec.gov (follow "Speeches and

Public Statements" hyperlink; then follow "Apr. 6, 2005: Remarks Before the Open
Meeting Regarding the IA/BD Rule" hyperlink).
21. Id.; William H. Donaldson, SEC Chairman, Opening Statement at Commission
Open Meeting of April 6, 2005, re: Broker-Dealer Rule, http://www.sec.gov (follow

"Speeches and Public Statements" hyperlink; then follow "Apr. 6, 2005: Opening
Statement at Commission Open Meeting of April 6, 2005, re: Broker-Dealer Rule"
hyperlink).
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outline the salient differences in the legal obligations that brokers, on the
one hand, and investment advisers, on the other, owe to their customers.
I next discuss the Rule as adopted by the SEC, the rationale for the Rule,
abuses of customers in fee-based accounts, and remaining interpretive
issues. I then argue that investors' confusion is likely to increase
because the required disclosure under the Rule is inadequate in light of
broker-dealers' intensive advertising campaigns, which are aimed at
persuading investors that their brokers are not salespersons but rather
trusted advisers. Finally, I propose recommendations. First, the SEC
should amend the Rule to prohibit broker-dealers from holding
themselves out as "financial consultants" or "financial advisers."
Second, since it is unlikely that the SEC will revisit this issue, I urge
courts and arbitrators to expand the obligations of broker-dealers to their
customers when they hold themselves out as something more than
salespersons who are marketing securities to investors. Specifically,
they should be held to the investment adviser's duty to provide
customers with "competent, unbiased and continuous advice. 2 2
DESCRIPTION OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES PROFESSIONALS

Federal securities regulation established two systems for regulating
financial services professionals: one, under the Securities Exchange Act
(SEA) regulating broker-dealers 23 and another, under the IAA,
regulating investment advisers.24 In addition, a third category of
professionals - financial planners - is not specifically defined under
either statute, but most financial planners are regulated as investment
advisers. It is understandable that there is confusion among investors
about the differences between broker-dealers, investment advisers, and
financial planners. In the competition for customers' dollars, they all
seek to provide the widest array of services, and the confusion is
compounded by the generality of the relevant statutory definitions.
Broker-Dealers
The SEA defines a broker as a person "engaged in the business of

22.
23.
24.

SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 187 (1963).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2004).
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-lto 80b-15 (2005).
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effecting transactions in securities for the account of others, 25 and a
dealer as a person "engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities for [its] own account., 26 Thus, the core function of a brokerdealer is executing transactions for customers; no other financial
services professional can perform this function. In addition, brokerdealers have always provided their customers with a wide range of other
services attendant to securities transactions.
The SEC identifies
"brokerage services" as including:
services provided throughout the

execution of a

securities

transaction, including providing research and advice prior to a

decision to buy or sell, implementing that decision on the most

advantageous terms and executing the transaction, arranging for
delivery of securities by the seller and payment by the buyer,
maintaining custody of27customer funds and securities and providing
recordkeeping services.

When making a recommendation to purchase a security, brokerdealers have obligations to make only recommendations that are suitable
for the customer, based on the customer's financial situation and
financial objectives. 28 In addition, broker-dealers may be liable for fraud
or negligence if a customer asks their advice about selling or holding a
security, and the information provided is false or misleading. 29 A
broker-dealer's relationship with his customers is not, however,
generally considered a fiduciary one, unless the broker exercises
investment discretion over the customer's account. 30 Broker-dealers,
therefore, have no obligation to monitor their customers' accounts or to
provide updated information about previously recommended securities.3"
In addition, since broker-dealers are salespersons, they are not
bound by the fiduciary prohibition on self-dealing transactions without
the principal's informed consent. The broker-dealer's obligations take

25.
26.
27.

15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2004).
Id.§ 78c(a)(5)(A).
Final Rule Release, supra note 2, at 20,428 n.37 (emphasis added).
See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide: The Collision of Ethics

28.
and Risk in SecuritiesLaw, 64 U. Prrr. L. REv. 490-92 (2003).
29. Id. at 495-96.

30.
31.

Id.at 487-89.
Id.at 504-05.
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the form of disclosure only. Rule lOb-10 3 2 sets forth the information
that must be disclosed to the customer before the completion of a
This
transaction, usually at the time of the trade confi-mation.
information is intended to protect investors by alerting them to potential
conflicts of interest with their broker-dealers.33 The firm must disclose
in what capacity the firm is making the transaction and, if the brokerdealer is acting as a principal, whether it is a market maker in the
security. 4 Additional disclosures relate to the firm's remuneration for
the transaction.3 5 Courts, however, have not held firms liable for failing
to disclose that the firm's compensation system may give account
executives incentives to sell particular securities.36
Investment Advisers
The IAA defines an investment adviser as "any person who, for
compensation, engages in the business of advising others.., as to the
value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or
32.
SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (2005).
33. See Confirmation of Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 34,962, 57 SEC
Docket 2674, 1994 WL 635201, at *3 (Nov. 10, 1994).
34.
Specifically, "whether the broker or dealer is acting as agent for such customer,
as agent for some other person, as agent for both such customer and some other person,
or as principal for its own account; and if the broker or dealer is acting as principal,
whether it is a market maker in the security (other than by reason of acting as a block
positioner)." 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob- 10(a)(2).
35. Id. § 240.10b-10(a)(2)(i) (agency transactions); id.§ 240.10b-10(a)(2)(ii)
(principal transactions).
36. See Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 825 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that plaintiffs failed to establish the requisite scienter on their Rule lob-5
claims that the firm failed to disclose that account executives received higher
compensation for sales of OTC stocks in which it made a market, and information may
not be material); Benzon v. Morgan Stanley, 2004 WL 62747 (M.D. Tenn. 2004)
(holding that firm had no duty to provide information about specific allocations or
incentives given to sell Class B mutual fund shares); Castillo v. Dean Witter Discover
& Co., 1998 WL 342050 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1998) (holding that firm did not have a
duty to disclose that account executives received more compensation for selling
proprietary mutual funds than other funds; also finding no scienter). Cf Chasins v.
Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that the firm
violated Rule lOb-5, when it made a written evaluation of customer's holdings and
recommended three stocks without disclosing that it made a market in these securities;
"the evil ...is that recommendations to clients will be based upon the best interests of
the dealer rather than the client.").
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selling securities. 37
The definition encompasses a wide range of
persons that provide a disparate variety of investment advice to different
customer bases, from publishers of stock tips on the internet38 to those
who manage investment portfolios for sophisticated institutional
investors. According to the Supreme Court, the basic function of an
investment adviser is "furnishing to clients on a personal basis
competent, unbiased and continuous advice regarding the sound
management of their investments. 39 It is well established that the
relationship between an investment adviser and his customer is a
fiduciary one. 40 Accordingly, where the investment adviser's duties

include management of the account, he is under an obligation to monitor
the performance of the account and to make appropriate changes in the

portfolio.4 '
In addition, because he is a fiduciary,4 z an investment adviser
cannot, either as principal or broker, knowingly engage in a securities
transaction with a client unless he discloses in writing to the client the
capacity in which he is acting and obtains the client's consent to the
transaction, prior to completion of the transaction. 43 The disclosure must
include the facts necessary to alert the client to the adviser's potential

conflict of interest; 44 it is not sufficient for the investment adviser merely
to provide a blanket disclosure and general consent. 45 This requirement
37.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l1) (2001). In
addition to the broker-dealer exclusion, the IAA also has exclusions for banks, other
professionals (including attorneys and accountants), and publishers of bona fide
publications of general circulation under certain circumstances.
38.
See, e.g., SEC v. Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (denying
defendants' motion to dismiss since an Internet site called Tokyo Joe that dispensed
stock tips may be an "investment adviser").
39.
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 187 (1963) (emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Id. at 191.
41.
See Erlich v. First Nat'l Bank of Princeton, 505 A.2d 220, 235 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 425 (1958).
42. Congress recognized that transactions between the investment adviser and the
client create the potential for self-dealing to the detriment of the adviser's client.
Interpretation of Section 206(3) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 1732, 17 C.F.R. § 276 (July 17, 1998).
43.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (2000).
44. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1732 (July 17, 1998).
45.
Opinion of Director of Trading and Exchange Division relating to § 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and §§ 10(b) &
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of prior, informed consent is based on the investment adviser's fiduciary
46
status and the fiduciary's obligation of undivided loyalty to the client.
FinancialPlanners
"Financial planner" is not defined in the federal securities laws,
although most financial planners are registered as investment advisers
under the IAA.4 7 The SEC recognizes financial planners as a distinct
profession of recent origin 48 and describes financial planning services as:
assisting clients in identifying long-term economic goals, analyzing
their current financial situation, and preparing a comprehensive
financial program to achieve those goals. A financial plan generally
seeks to address a wide spectrum of a client's long-term financial
needs, including insurance, savings, tax and estate planning, and
investments, taking into consideration the client's goals and
situation, including anticipated retirement or other employee
benefits. Typically, what distinguishesfinancialplanningfrom other
types of advisory 49
services is the breadth and scope of the advisory
servicesprovided.

15(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
40, 1945 WL 26361, at *2 (Feb. 5, 1945).
46. Id. See also Arleen W. Hughes, Exchange Act Release No. 4048, 27 S.E.C.
629 at 638-39 (Feb. 18, 1948), afd sub nom. Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir.
1949). The SEC also observed that these disclosure requirements would not be
imposed upon broker-dealers who render investment advice merely incidentally to their
broker-dealer activities "unless they have by a course of conduct placed themselves in a
position of trust and confidence as to their customers."
47. See Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners,
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as
a Component of Other Financial Services, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1092,
39 SEC Docket 494 (Oct. 8, 1987) (providing guidance for determining whether
financial planners, pension consultants and sports/entertainment representatives are
investment advisers, based on whether the person (1) provides advice, or issues reports
or analyses, regarding securities; (2) is in the business of providing such services; and
(3) provides such services for compensation).
48. Final Rule Release, supra note 2, at 20,438.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
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THE RULE

Rule 202(a)( 11)-1 excludes broker-dealers who offer fee-based
accounts from the definition of "investment adviser," so long as any
investment advice given is "solely incidental to the brokerage services"
provided to the fee-based accounts. ° In addition, advertisements and
contracts for fee-based accounts must contain a "prominent statement"
describing the account as a brokerage account, and not an advisory
account; alluding to possible conflicts of interests; and identifying a
person at the brokerage firm with whom the customer can discuss the
differences." The Rule also identifies three situations where investment
advice would not be deemed solely incidental to the brokerage services.
These situations are: independent advisory services,5 2 financial planning
services,53 and discretionary accounts. 4 The Rule makes it clear that
this is a non-exclusive list.
Rationalefor the Rule
The SEC bases the broker-dealer exclusion on both legislative
history and policy grounds. First, under its reading of the IAA's
legislative history, it is not consistent with congressional intent to
regulate broker-dealers as investment advisers if the broker-dealers offer
investment advice to customers with fee-based accounts, since brokerdealers are already regulated under the SEA. 5 Second, since brokerdealers may provide customers with better advice if their compensation
is not transaction-driven, and since customers may perceive a benefit to
fee-based accounts, additional regulation should not be imposed on
firms that might discourage the firms from offering fee-based accounts. 6
I examine each of these premises below.

50.
51.
52.
53.
text.
54.
text.
55.
56.

SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)-l(a)(1)(i) (2005).
The required language is set forth infra note 101.
17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)-l(b)(1), discussed infra note 88.
Id. § 275.202(a)(11)-I(b)(2), discussed infra notes 89-95 and accompanying
Id.

§ 275.202(a)(1 1)-I(b)(3), discussed infra notes 96-99 and accompanying

See infra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
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Legislative History
In the SEC's view,5 7 the congressional intent behind the IAA was to
regulate as investment advisers those persons whose activities were not
already subject to federal securities regulation. Since broker-dealers
were already regulated under the SEA, Congress carved out an exclusion
to permit broker-dealers to provide investment advice to their brokerage
customers without subjecting them to additional regulation. Congress
used the statutory language, "solely incidental to the conduct of his
business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation
therefor," 8 because at that time all brokerage accounts were
commission-based. Hence, the "no special compensation"5 9 requirement
served as a workable "bright-line" to distinguish between broker-dealers
who were excluded from the definition of investment adviser and those
who would be required to register; namely, those who offered advisory
services for a separate fee, usually through a separate investment
advisory department.
My own reading of the legislative history leaves me unconvinced
that we can ascertain any congressional intent behind the statutory
exclusion. The genesis of the IAA itself is clear. In response to a
directive contained in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
the SEC conducted hearings and studied abuses in investment trusts and
investment companies. In the course of that study, it became interested
in learning more about investment advisers. It conducted a survey of
investment counselors that were associated with investment companies,
but also recognized that there were many others offering investment
advisory services about whom it knew very little. The report, which the
SEC transmitted to Congress in August 1939, stressed the need to
improve the professionalism of the industry, both by eliminating tipsters
and other scam artists and by emphasizing the importance of unbiased
advice, which spokespersons for investment counsel saw as
distinguishing their profession from investment bankers and brokers. 60
The initial legislation that was the subject of hearings before a
57.
58.

See Final Rule Release, supra note 2, at 20,430-32.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)( 11)(C) (2001).

59.
60.

Id.

See SEC, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES: INVESTMENT
COUNSEL, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, INVESTMENT SUPERVISORY, AND INVESTMENT
ADVISORY SERVICES,

H.R. Doc. No. 477 at 27-30 (1939).
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Senate subcommittee in April 194061 contained two titles, the first
dealing with investment companies (which became the Investment
Company Act) and the second dealing with investment advisers (which
became the IAA). This bill contained one definition of "investment
adviser," applicable to the regulation of both investment companies and
investment advisers, which did not include an exclusion for brokerdealers.6 2
The SEC testimony before the Senate subcommittee
emphasized that the principal purpose of Title II was to require
registration to find out more about "how many people are engaged in
this business, what their connections are, what is the extent of their
authority, what is their background, who they are, and how they handle
the people's funds. 63 The focus of the Senate subcommittee hearing
was on the appropriateness of regulating investment advisers, rather than
on definitional issues, as many members of the investment counsel
industry asserted that regulation was ill-advised. 64
After the hearings before the Senate subcommittee, the SEC and
representatives from the investment counsel industry worked out a new
version of the legislation.6 5 In this version, Title II had its own
definitional section and its own definition of "investment adviser" that
included the broker exclusion.66 There was no commentary explaining
the addition. Both the House and Senate reports accompanying the
legislation simply stated that the definition excludes "brokers (insofar as
their advice is merely incidental to brokerage transactions for which they
receive only brokerage commissions). 6 7 The only comment on the
definition before the full House or Senate was from a representative who
objected to the exclusions because they exempted most of the persons
from whom small investors receive investment advice.68
In short, we have little evidence from which to deduce

61.
S. 3580, 76th Cong. (1940).
62. Id. § 45(a)(16).
63. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearing on S. 3580 Before a
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. 48,319 (1940)
(statement of David Schenker, Chief Counsel, SEC Investment Trust Study).
64. See generally., id. at 736 (statement of Rudolf P. Berle, General Counsel,
Investment Counsel Association of America, NYC).
65. H.R. 10065 and S. 4108, 76th Cong. (3d. Sess. 1940).
66. Id. § 202(a)(1 1).
67. H.R. Rep. No. 76-2639, at 28 (1940); S. Rep. No. 76-1775, at 22 (1940).
68. 86 CONG. REc. 9814 (1940) (statement of Rep. Hinshaw).
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congressional intent. We are left with the plain meaning of the statutory
exclusion, which sets forth two conditions: the investment advice must
be "solely incidental to" the conduct of the broker-dealer's business, and
the broker-dealer must not receive "special compensation" for the
advice.69 In addition, the statute gives the SEC authority to provide
further exemptions from the definition.7 ° While the SEC's view is a
possible interpretation of congressional intent, it is by no means the only
possible interpretation.
Policy Reasons
The SEC gave two policy reasons for expanding the broker-dealer
exclusion: to improve the brokers' advice-giving function and to
increase investors' choice.
First, the SEC stated that broker-dealers may provide investors with
better advice if their compensation is not transaction-based 71 and
referred to the Tully Report and its "finding" that fee-based
compensation would better align the interests of broker-dealers and their
clients.72 In 1994, SEC Chair Arthur Levitt created the Committee on
Compensation Practices 73 and gave it three charges: review industry
compensation practices for registered representatives and branch
managers; identify actual and perceived conflicts of interest for both
69.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1)(C) (2001).
70. Id. § 80b-2(a)(1 1)(F). For this reason, I do not argue that the SEC exceeded its
authority in adopting the Rule.
71. Final Rule Release, supra note 2, at 20,425-26. The SEC Special Study also
pointed out the dangers of commission-based compensation:
The salesman is economically motivated to persuade customers to enter into as many
transactions as possible, thereby creating the danger of excessive trading or churning;
he also benefits most from sales of those securities for which the rate of commission
is highest, and is thus motivated to recommend purchases of securities without
sufficient regard for their merit or suitability for a particular customer.
SEC Special Study, supra note 7, at 254.
72.
See Final Rule Release, supra note 2, at 20,426 n.12.
73.
The members were Daniel P. Tully, Chairman and CEO of Merrill Lynch &
Co. (Chair); Thomas E. O'Hara, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, National
Association of Investors Corporation; Warren E. Buffett, Chairman and CEO of
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.; Raymond A. Mason, Chairman and CEO, Legg Mason, Inc.;
and Samuel L. Hayes, Jacob H. Schiff Professor of Investment Banking, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University. See Tully Report, supra note 4,
at 86,510.

44

FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LA W

[Vol. XI

registered representatives and branch managers; and identify "best
practices" used in the industry to eliminate, reduce, or mitigate these
conflicts. The Committee's discussion of fee-based versus commissionbased compensation is only a small part of the Tully Report.
The Committee concluded that "the existing commission-based
compensation system work[ed] remarkably well for the vast majority of
investors,, 74 although an unidentified majority of the Committee
expressed the view that "if the retail brokerage industry were being
created today from the ground up [they] would not design a
compensation system based only on commissions paid for completed
transactions. 75 This unidentified majority went on to assert that "[tihe
most important role of the registered representative is, after all, to
provide investment counsel to individual clients, not to generate
transaction revenues., 7 6 Notice that, under this view, a broker-dealer is
an investment adviser that can execute securities transactions, which
would essentially write the "solely incidental to" condition out of the
statute.77 While one of the eight specific "best practices" identified in
the Report was "[p]aying a portion of [registered representative]
compensation based on client assets in an account, regardless of
transaction activity, so the [registered representatives] receive some
compensation even if they advise a client to 'do nothing,' ' 78 these
statements must be taken in the context of an examination of many
practices at brokerage firms that create more serious, undisclosed
conflicts of interest, such as sales contests and higher commissions for
proprietary products, practices that regulators have been slow in
eliminating.7 9
74.

Tully Report, supranote 4, at 86,508.

75.
76.

Id. at 86,509.
Id. at 86,509.

77. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2001).
78. Tully Report, supranote 4, at 86,508-09.
79. As one example, in 1999, the NASD proposed to prohibit many of the
questionable sales practices enumerated in the Tully Report. After public comment, the
proposals were not adopted. See NASD, Salesperson Compensation Practices, NASD
Notice to Members 99-81 (Sept. 1999), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/
rules regs/documents/notice to members/nasdw_004080.pdf. The NASD recently
solicited comments on another rule proposal to prohibit some of these practices. See
NASD, Sales Contests and Non-Cash Compensation, NASD Notice to Members 05-40
(June 2005), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rulesregs/documents/
notice to members/nasdw_014347.pdf.

2005]

BROKERS AND ADVISERS-

WHAT'S IN A NAME?

45

Second, the SEC stated that some investors may prefer a flat fee or
asset-based fee structure and that investors should be allowed to make
this choice.80 It is difficult to argue against customer choice, provided
that it is an informed one. However, if there is a mutual desire for fee
accounts, it is not clear that treating these accounts as advisory accounts
poses a significant regulatory disincentive.
Abuses of Customers in Fee-BasedAccounts
The benefits of fee-based accounts are that they may deter some
forms of classic broker-dealer fraud such as churning 8 and provide
customers with some assurance that their brokers' advice is not given to
generate more broker income. In addition, some customers may prefer a
fee either because of its predictability or because of the expectation they
will obtain better service from their account executive. On the other
hand, costs for fee-based programs will be higher for customers who
engage in infrequent trading activity, particularly for those who follow a
buy-and-hold strategy, an investment strategy generally more
appropriate for small or inexperienced investors. In addition, fee-based
programs may encourage customers to engage in imprudent, excessive
trading because of the volume discount.82 For these reasons, the choice
between the two types of accounts requires a careful assessment of the
investor's needs, and fee-based accounts are not appropriate for many
investors.
The SEC's adoption of the Rule came at a time when there was
considerable evidence that some brokerage firms had placed customers
in fee-based accounts where their interests would be better served in
commission-based accounts. The firms had also failed to monitor
customers' trading activity to assure that a fee-based account remained
appropriate for the customer; and, in some instances, had even failed to

80. See Final Rule Release, supra note 2, at 20,426.
81.
Excessive trading in an account by the broker to generate commission income.
See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in
Securities Arbitration,23 CARDOZO L. REv. 991, 1010-11 (2002).
82. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) identifies the "primary advantage" to
customers of fee-based accounts as a "volume discount." NYSE, Non-Managed Fee
Based Account Programs, NYSE Information Memo 05-51 at 1 (June 2005), available
at http://www.nyse.com (follow "Regulation" hyperlink; then follow "Information
Memos" hyperlink; then follow "05-51" hyperlink).
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assign an account executive to handle the customer's account. The
broker-dealers' motivation, unfortunately, seemed to be "all about the
money" rather than providing improved service to the customer.8 3 Both
the NYSE and NASD have brought enforcement actions against firms
for inappropriately placing customers in fee-based accounts and for
failing to assign an account representative to some fee-based accounts.84
In addition, the NYSE and NASD have taken regulatory action to
curb the over-selling of fee-based accounts. As with securities and
trading strategies, broker-dealers must have reasonable grounds for
believing that a fee-based account is appropriate for a customer in light
of the services provided, cost and customer preference. s5 NYSE Rule
405A 86 requires pre-account opening disclosures designed to enable a
customer to make an informed decision about the account's
appropriateness; a determination by the firm that the fee-based account
is appropriate for the customer prior to opening the account; ongoing
monitoring of the customer's transactional activity to assure that a feebased account continues to be appropriate for the customer; and followup with those customers whose level of trading activity indicates that a
fee-based account is not appropriate.8 7

83.
The SEC alluded to these problems in the Final Rule Release, supra note 2, at
20,433 n.95.
84. See Press Release, NASD, NASD Fines Raymond James $750,000 for FeeBased Account Violations (Apr. 27, 2005) available at http://www.nasd.com/
web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_013876;
see also
Press Release, NASD, NASD Orders Morgan Stanley to Pay over $6.1 Million for FeeBased Account Violations (Aug. 2, 2005) available at http://www.nasd.com/
web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_014804.
85. Memorandum, NASD, Fee-Based Compensation: NASD Reminds Members
That Fee-Based Compensation Programs Must be Appropriate, NASD Notice to
Members 03-68 (Nov. 2003), availableat http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules-regs/
documents/notice to members/nasdw_003079.pdf.
86. Adopted in Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc.;
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Notice of Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval to Amendments No. 2 and No. 3 Thereto to Adopt Rule 405A
("Non-Managed Fee-Based Account Programs - Disclosure and Monitoring"),
Exchange Act Release No. 51,907, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,458 (June 29, 2005).
87. See NYSE Rule 405A (Non-Managed Fee-Based Account ProgramsDisclosure
and
Monitoring),
available at http://rules.nyse.com/nysetools/
ExchangeViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_5&manual=/nyse/nyse rules/nyse-rules/
(follow "Conduct of Accounts (Rules 401-414)" hyperlink).
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Remaining InterpretiveDifficulties under the Rule
While the controversy over the broker-dealer exclusion was heated
and rancorous, a consensus did emerge that the problem was not brokerdealers charging asset-based fees. Rather, the problem was whether
broker-dealers were holding themselves out as something other than
traditional full-service brokers, and, if so, whether the investing public
would be misled and harmed by this.
Since broker-dealers are
marketing the fee-based accounts on the quality of their investment
advice, it would seem obvious that they could not meet the statutory
requirement of "incidental" advice.8 8 The SEC, however, did not adopt
this view and declined to adopt a narrower construction urged by some
commentators 89 to limit the exclusion to "minor, insignificant, or
infrequent" advice. 90 Rather, the SEC took the position that investment
advice is "solely incidental to" brokerage services when the services are
"inconnection with and reasonably related to" the brokerage services 9'
or when the advisory services are "liable to happen as a consequence of"
or "follow as a consequence of' the conduct of the broker's business. 9
Prior to 1999, the SEC had little occasion to consider the "solely
incidental to" 93 statutory language. Instead, regulatory guidance on the
broker-dealer exclusion focused on the requirement of no "special
compensation, ' '94 since, particularly in the era of fixed rates and bundled
brokerage services, this appeared to provide a clear distinction between

88. Indeed, the SEC itself expressed reservations about whether the advice
provided in fee-based accounts can be considered "solely incidental to" brokerage
services when these accounts are marketed principally based on the quality of the
advisory services. See Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to be Investment Advisers,
Exchange Act Release No. 42,099, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1845, 70 SEC
Docket 2486, 1999 WL 999763, at *5 (Nov. 4, 1999) and Certain Broker-Dealers
Deemed Not to be Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release No. 50,980, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2340, 84 SEC Docket 2208, 2005 WL 38804, at *19 (Jan. 6,
2005).
89.
For contrasting views of the dictionary meanings, see Final Rule Release, supra
note 2, at 20,436 n.135.
90. Final Rule Release, supra note 2, at 20,437.
91.
Id. at 20,436.
92. Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to be Investment Advisers, 2005 WL
38804, at *18.
93.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1)(C) (2001).
94. Id.
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brokerage and advisory services. 95 Thus, shortly after the enactment of
the IAA, the SEC stated:
that portion of clause (C) which refers to "special compensation"
amounts to an equally clear recognition that a broker or dealer who is
specially compensated for the rendition of advice should be
considered an investment adviser and not be excluded from the
purview of the Act merely because he is also engaged in effecting
market transactions in securities .... The essential distinction to be
borne in mind in considering borderline cases... is the distinction
between compensation for advice itself and compensation for
96
services of another characterto which advice is merely incidental.

SEC No-Action Letter positions interpreting the "solely incidental
to" exclusion are inconsistent 97 and unhelpful. 98 The staff appeared to
find the exclusion unavailable when it determined that the investment
advisory services predominated over the brokerage services. 99 Thus, it

95. In the view of the SEC, "'special compensation" was included in the statute for
the express purpose of identifying advice that was not provided as part of the package
of traditional brokerage services. Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to be Investment
Advisers, 2005 WL 38804, at *7.
96. See Opinion of General Counsel relating to Section 202(a)( 11)(C) of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2, 1940 SEC
LEXIS 1466 (October 28, 1940) (emphasis added).
97. Compare, e.g., their inconsistent positions on market timing services--Calton
& Assoc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1348 (Oct. 11, 1988)
(holding that the services were not solely incidental) with Toney Reed, SEC No-Action
Letter, 1985 No-Act. LEXIS 2346 (July 15, 1985) (holding that the services were solely
incidental) and compare, e.g., their inconsistent positions on financial planning
services-Roney & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2016 (Apr.
3, 1985); Financial Planning & Advisory Services, SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL
13190 (Feb. 11, 1979) (holding both services not solely incidental) with Nathan &
Lewis Sec., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 434 (Apr. 4, 1988);
Elmer D. Robinson, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1610 (Jan. 6,
1986) (holding both services may be solely incidental).
98. See, e.g., Gunter Kaiserauer, SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
2916 (Sept. 20, 1982) (holding seminars and book on investment strategy not solely
incidental).
99. The following were found not to be solely incidental: general partner/managing
agent of an investment company (John Terwilliger, SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL
10504 (June 27, 1977)); selection of an investment adviser for a fund (A.I.L. Sec. Co.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 10391 (Apr. 3, 1976)); evaluation of performance of
investment manager (William Bye Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 6670 (Apr.
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had previously identified financial planning and investment
supervisory/investment management services as not solely incidental to
brokerage services.100 In addition, it consistently warned that holding
oneself out as a financial planner, financial adviser, or financial
consultant to induce the sale of securities may violate the anti-fraud
provisions.'0 '
In the Final Rule, the SEC set forth three instances where the advice
is not solely incidental to the brokerage relationship.10 2 Two of them 3
are relevant for this discussion. First, the broker-dealer exclusion is not
available to a broker-dealer that provides advice as part of a financial
plan or in connection with providing financial planning services and (i)
holds itself out generally to the public as a financial planner, (ii) delivers
to the customer a financial plan, or (iii) represents to the customer that
the advice is provided as part of a financial plan or in connection with
financial planning services) °4
Commentators on both sides saw problems with this carving-out of
"financial planning" services. Broker-dealers asserted that it could
interfere with their obligation as broker-dealers to make suitable
recommendations to their customers.'0 5 Others pointed out that brokerdealers could use a different title, such as "financial consultant," to
achieve the same result.10 6 Both these objections make valid points
about the lack of certainty associated with the phrase "financial
26, 1973)); selection and monitoring of investment adviser (Capital Asset Program,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 10950 (Dec. 1, 1974)).
100.
See Townsend & Associates, SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 739 (Sept. 21, 1994); Investment Management & Research, Inc., SEC NoAction Letter, 1977 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 184 (Jan. 27, 1977).
101.
See Security Sources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
664 (May 18, 1989); Elmer D. Robinson, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 1610 (Jan. 6, 1986); Haight & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34,9082, 44
S.E.C. 481 (Feb. 19, 1971).
102. Final Rule Release, supra note 2, at 20,437. See also SEC Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(1l)-1(b)(1) (2005); 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(ll)l(b)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(1 I)-l(b)(3).
103.
In addition, a broker-dealer that charges a separate fee, or separately contracts,
for advisory services cannot claim the broker-dealer exclusion.
17 C.F.R. §
275.202(a)(1l)-l(b)(1). This is a "bright-line" test consistent with industry practice.
See Final Rule Release, supra note 2, at 20,440.
104.
17 C.F.R. § 275.202 (a)(11)-l(b)(2).
105. Final Rule Release, supra note 2 at 20,438.
106. Id. at 20,439.
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planning." The SEC did not adequately address these concerns, but
made three assertions. First, it did not want to interfere with the brokerdealer's suitability analysis. 10 7 Second, it believed that investors
understand the difference between "financial planning" and brokerage
services 10 (a debatable proposition). Finally, a broker-dealer would be
subject to the IAA if it holds itself out as providing financial services,
"whether it uses those terms or not."' 0 9 However, the Rule does not
prohibit broker-dealers from calling themselves "financial advisors" or
"financial consultants." In the view of the SEC, these are "generic

terms" descriptive of what many persons in the financial services
industry do." 0
Second, broker-dealers are not excepted from the IAA for any
accounts (commission-based or fee-based) over which they exercise
investment discretion." 1' This is a change in the staff position;
previously, a broker-dealer would be considered an investment adviser
only if his business consisted almost exclusively of managing accounts
on a discretionary basis. 12 In the SEC's view, the discretionary power
is "qualitatively distinct"'"1 3 from simply providing investment advice;
"this quintessentially supervisory or managerial character warrants the
protection of the Advisers Act because of the 'special trust and
confidence inherent' in such relationships."' ' 14 Where the broker-dealer

controls the account, it is an investment adviser.
Accordingly, a broker-dealer that holds itself out, in its advertising,

107.
108.

Id.
Id.

109. Id.
110. Id. The IAA prohibits the use of "investment counsel" unless the person's
"principal business is acting as an investment adviser and a substantial part of his
business consists of rendering investment supervisory services," Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-8(c) (2005); therefore broker-dealers avoid this
term.
111.
See, e.g., where the broker-dealer "exercises investment discretion over the
customer account," SEC Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(1 1)l(b)(3) (2005), except where the investment discretion is granted on a temporary or
limited basis, 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(1 1)-l(d).
112.
Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Certain Brokers and Dealers,
Exchange Act Release No. 15,215, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 640, 43 Fed.
Reg. 47176, 1978 SEC LEXIS 575 (Oct. 5, 1978).
113.
Final Rule Release, supra note 2, at 20,440.
114. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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as providing a broad range of planning services to its customers should
be considered an investment adviser. In addition, a broker-dealer that
exercises de facto control over the account should be treated as an
investment adviser, because, just as with dejure discretionary accounts,
the broker and the customer have agreed that the broker will manage the
account. Courts and arbitrators have long recognized that a brokerdealer's responsibilities to its customer expand if the broker-dealer
exercises de facto control over the account.115 In both of these
situations, the broker-dealer is inviting the customer to place his trust
and confidence in the broker-dealer to manage the customer's financial
affairs. The customer who relies on the broker-dealer to manage his
account is acting reasonably in these circumstances.
INVESTORS ARE LIKELY TO BE MISLED

In the face of aggressive efforts to sell fee-based accounts and the
firms' intensive advertising campaigns to sell their advisory services,
investors' confusion is, unfortunately, only likely to increase. I examine
here the disclosure required by the Rule and find it unlikely to cure
investors' confusion.
Advertisements and contracts for fee-based accounts must contain a
"prominent statement" describing the account as a brokerage, and not an
advisory, account; alluding to possible conflicts of interest; and
identifying a person at the brokerage firm with whom the customer can
discuss the differences. 1 6 The required disclosure, however, is not
likely to counteract the persuasive and misleading effects of the heavy
advertising campaign promoting broker-dealer advisory services. First,
the language is formalistic and jargon-laden and assumes that a customer
will understand the distinctions between a brokerage and an advisory
account. Second, while the disclaimer may alert customers to potential
conflicts of interest between brokers and customers, it does not provide

115. Black & Gross, Economic Suicide, supra note 28, at 488.
116. The required language is as follows: "Your account is a brokerage account and
not an advisory account. Our interests may not always be the same as yours. Please ask
us questions to make sure you understand your rights and our obligations to you,
including the extent of our obligations to disclose conflicts of interest and to act in your
best interest. We are paid both by you and, sometimes, by people who compensate us
based on what you buy. Therefore, our profits, and our salespersons' compensation,
may vary by product and over time." 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11 )-l(a)(1)(ii).
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any warning that the broker-dealer does not have any legal obligation to
monitor its customers' accounts - the precise message that the ads are
' 17
selling. Third, inviting the customer to "ask [the firm] questions"'
unfairly puts the burden on the customer to figure out the questions he
should be asking. Fourth, if the customer asked about "[his] rights and
[the firm's] obligations to [him]," '18 it is unlikely that a spokesperson of
the broker-dealer would provide a clear and impartial explanation.
If the disclosure is not likely to counteract the effects of the
advertising, are there effective regulatory curbs on misleading
advertising? The NASD regulates broker-dealer advertising1 9 and has
asserted that "the standards imposed by the NASD advertising rules are
perhaps the highest imposed upon any industry.' 120 Its advertising rules
specifically prohibit an "exaggerated, unwarranted or misleading
statement or claim.",12 1 In a recent disciplinary proceeding, the NASD
charged that a Long Island-based brokerage firm's radio advertisements
(aired heavily in the New York metropolitan area) were misleading
because they purported to be about actual investors whose investments
would have performed better if they had invested with the firm, but the
firm could not substantiate the existence of these investors. In addition,
its radio advertisements embodied the concept of "providing returns of
10 percent and more" to "tens of thousands" of customers., 22 In a press
release announcing the charges, NASD Vice Chairman Mary L. Shapiro
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
NASD

Manual,

Conduct

Rule

2210

(2004),

available

at

http://www.nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid=I 189&element id= 115
9000466 (follow "2200. Communications with Customers and the Public" hyperlink;
then follow "2210. Communications with the Public" hyperlink).
120.

NASD, REPORT

OF NASD REGULATION, PUBLIC POLICY SESSIONS CONCERNING

ONLINE BROKERAGE,
(Sept. 21, 1999), available at
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW
006161 &ssSourceNodeld=604.
121.
Conduct Rule 2210, supra note 119, at (d)(1)(B) and (d)(2)(C).
122. NASD, Disciplinary and Other NASD Actions (2004), available at
http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/enforcement/documents/monthly-disciplinary-action
s/nasdw_01 1982.pdf. NASD subsequently fined the firm, barred it from conducting
public seminars for thirty days, and ordered it to pre-file its sales literature with NASD
for six months. Press Release, NASD, NASD Fines David Lerner Associates $115,000
For Misleading Advertising and Communications With The Public (Sept. 30, 2005),
available
at
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=S SGETPAGE&
ssDocName=NASDW 015088.
THE

ADVERTISEMENT

OF

2005]

BROKERS AND ADVISERS-

WHAT'S IN A NAME?

53

specifically referred to the firm's "use of statements designed to appear
as customer testimonials" as "misleading and an abuse of the investing
public.' 23 Apart from the guarantee of a specific rate of return, 124 the

advertising campaigns by the major brokerage firms simply seem like a
more sophisticated version of the conduct NASD alleged to be illegal in
this case. The NASD thus has the regulatory power to curb misleading

advertising, but at least to date it has not expressed publicly any interest
firms in connection with their "phony
in charging the major brokerage
125

testimonials" advertising.

The cynical rejoinder to these concerns is that everyone knows that
advertising is puffery and reasonable investors should not be misled by
sales talk.

26

This is a better argument when the advertising is

preposterous or tongue-in-cheek; after all, reasonable investors probably
should not expect that they (unlike the auto mechanic in the E*Trade

advertisement) could purchase their own country with their investment
proceeds. The current advertisements, however, are not so far-fetched

and communicate a believable, if misleading, message - that investors
can rely on their financial advisers to manage their money over the long
haul.
Courts have long held that the misleading content of
advertisements should be determined by their impact on the average
27

investor.1

123.
Press Release, NASD, NASD Charges David Lerner Associates with Using
Misleading Radio Spots, Investment Seminars, Other Ads (Oct. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW
011623. The press release also noted the firm's significant expenditures on advertising
and marketing.
124.
This is a specific violation of Conduct Rule 2210, supra note 119, at (d)(1)(D)
prohibiting predictions of performance.
125.
A recent search on both Westlaw and Lexis databases found no disciplinary
proceedings against Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley or Salomon Smith Barney
involving Conduct Rule 2210 violations.
126.
Corporations successfully assert the puffery defense in Rule lOb-5 claims for
false and misleading statements. See Jennifer O'Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo.
The Unfortunate Re-emergence of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud
Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697 (1998).
127.
See, e.g., SEC v. C.R. Richmond & Co., 565 F.2d 1101, 1104-05 (9th Cir.
1977) (stating that statements about investment performance are to be measured from
the viewpoint of a "person unskilled and unsophisticated in investment matters");
Marketlines, Inc. v. SEC, 384 F.2d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that the SEC has a
duty to protect gullible investors); SEC v. Lindsey-Holman Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,704, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15991 (M.D. Ga. 1978) (holding that the effect
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RECOMMENDATIONS

In the release announcing the Rule, the SEC gave the SEC staff the
task of further study of the policy issues raised during the lengthy
rulemaking process. It specifically asked whether the broker-dealer
advertising rules should be enhanced. 2 ' I would like to answer the
SEC's question. It made a serious mistake in allowing broker-dealers to
hold themselves out as "financial advisers" or "financial consultants.' ' 9
and the firm's
Registered representatives are salespersons,
advertisements should make this clear, so that investors will not be
misled. Accordingly, broker-dealers should be prohibited from holding
themselves out as "financial advisers" or "financial consultants," as
these terms convey (as the firms surely intend them to) a relationship
that is more conducive to trust and confidence on the part of an investor
than an arms-length relationship between a salesperson and a customer.
While the problem is broader than fee-based accounts, a first step in
tackling it would be to amend the Rule to condition the promotion of
fee-based accounts on prohibiting use of these terms.
I recognize, however, that after a six-year rulemaking process, with
a thorough airing of all viewpoints, 30 the SEC is unlikely soon to
consider amending the Rule. Accordingly, if broker-dealers are allowed
to hold themselves out as "financial advisers" or "financial consultants"
in order to sell their services, their legal obligations should be
Courts and
commensurate with those of investment advisers.
arbitrators 3 ' should deem it misleading for broker-dealers to hold

of advertising would be measured from the viewpoint of an unskilled and
unsophisticated person). These cases all involved violations of the advertising rules
applicable to investment advisers and promulgated by the SEC pursuant to its authority
under the IAA. These rules specifically prohibit testimonials, references to past specific
recommendations (unless it is a list of all past recommendations in the preceding period
of at least a year), and representations that any graph or formula can determine which
securities to buy or sell. SEC Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-

1 (2005).
128.
Final Rule Release, supra note 2, at 20,442. See also supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text for concerns expressed by Commissioner Glassman and Chair
Donaldson about broker-dealer advertising.
129. Final Rule Release, supranote 2, at 20,439. See also supra notes 67-68.
130. See supranote 12.
131.
Today virtually all disputes between customers and broker-dealers are
arbitrated before the SRO arbitration forums. See Black & Gross, Making It Up As

2005]

BROKERS AND ADVISERS-

WHAT'S IN A NAME?

55

themselves out as being advisers without accepting the legal
responsibilities attendant to that title. In disputes between customers
and broker-dealers, a customer should be permitted to introduce as
evidence the firm's advertising and explain how it affected his
understanding of his relationship with his broker. In turn, the firm or
registered representative will have an opportunity to demonstrate that
they made it clear to the customer that the registered representative was
a salesperson and did not owe a fiduciary duty to the customer. The
judge or the arbitrator should carefully consider the evidence presented
by both sides and make an assessment of the likely impact of the firm's
advertising on the customer's understanding and expectations about his
relationship with his broker-dealer. Specifically, if the advertising
created a reasonable expectation that the broker-dealer was more than a
salesperson, then it should be responsible for monitoring the customers'
accounts and providing updated information so that the customer and
broker together can reevaluate the customer's financial situation in light
13 2
of changing market conditions -just as the advertisements promise.
The principle that broker-dealers who act as investment advisers
should be held to heightened standards is not new. The SEC previously
understood that an investor was likely to become confused if he was
dealing with a broker-dealer who was also an investment adviser;
because he would expect that an investment adviser to be independent of
the business of selling securities. In recognition of this, the SEC
previously held dual registrants to high fiduciary standards and to
33
enhanced disclosure requirements relating to conflicts of interest.
Adoption of the Rule should not immunize broker-dealers from the
consequences of their misleading conduct.
They should not be
permitted to hold themselves out as dispensing investment advice and
yet assert that they are not investment advisers and are not fiduciaries.
The SEC previously recognized that it is misleading for broker-dealers4
3
to hold themselves out as financial planning experts as a sales tactic.1

They Go Along, supra note 81, at 991.
132.
Courts will enforce a broker's promise to monitor the customer's account. See
Ahluwalia/Shetty v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3286 (S.D.N.Y.
1998), aff'dmem., 173 F.3d 843 (2d Cir. 1999).
133.
Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
134. See Haight & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34,9082, 44 S.E.C. 481 (Feb. 19,
1971) (involving radio advertisements not dissimilar from those airing today on
television); Security Sources Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
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This principle is even more true today where the combined force of the
marketing of fee-based accounts and of the broker-dealers' heavy
advertising campaigns create conditions that unfortunately are almost
certain to result in increased investor confusion.
A practical objection to finding that the broker has a responsibility
to monitor the account and provide updated information is that it may be
unworkable for the broker to provide this service and hence it is
unrealistic for investors to expect it. The answer to this is that brokerdealers should not promise to provide something they cannot deliver.
Perhaps it is unrealistic for retail investors to believe that they can obtain
continuous, unbiased investment advice - but they should not be
deceived into thinking that they will be getting it.
CONCLUSION

This article seeks to demonstrate that the SEC made a mistake in
adopting the Rule. Because the firms market fee-based accounts on the
basis of the quality of the investment advisory services that the customer
will receive, they are exceeding the boundaries of excluded brokerage
' the investment advisory services are not "solely
advice under the IAA; "35
In addition, in their
incidental to ' 136 the brokerage services.
advertisements, the firms are holding themselves out as providing
financial planning or investment management services to their customers
- which exceeds the exclusions set forth in the Rule itself.
Since it is unlikely that the SEC will reconsider the Rule, it will fall
to the courts and arbitrators to deal with the disputes that will arise when
customers' expectations are not fulfilled. I propose that the courts and
arbitrators should simply take the brokerage firms at their word. Since
they promised continuous, unbiased investment advice, they should be
held to that standard.

664 (May 18, 1989); Universal Heritage Inv. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1971 WL
7544 (June 19, 1971).
135. Investment Advisers Act § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1)(C) (2001).
136. Id.

